Strategic Rebalance of the Three Component Air Force
Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we will have to think.
-Winston Churchill 1 After a decade of major combat operations in Southwest Asia, the nation's leaders face a familiar post-war task. The U.S. military must decrease spending, particularly on ballooning manpower costs, while maintaining readiness, modernization, and adequate force structure. In an era of restrictive budgets and mounting debt, leaders at the highest levels have called for creative solutions to ensure America can meet the challenges to its national security interests. The Total Force Enterprise (TFE) provides a strategic framework between the Active Component (AC) and Reserve To properly frame any problem in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous world, it is essential to first step back-or gain altitude-and conduct a scan of the strategic landscape. To examine the Total Force rebalance issue and get a better vector on how the USAF should proceed, this paper looks at both enduring and recently released national strategic guidance documents. It then makes connections with recent analytical reports and three levers of the RC -capabilities, capacity and cost savings.
Finally, it offers considerations for additional changes required for the next evolutionary step of the Three Component Air Force. The confluence of this analysis points towards phased implementation of a modified USAF Total Force mix to attain the agility and reversibility called for by civilian leadership. 4 Environmental Scanning from 50,000 Feet
Environmental scanning provides context and reference points to accurately frame the problem of finding the right Total Force mix, much of which can be derived from history. Understanding the path and evolution of RC utilization promotes awareness for significant parameter changes that have necessitated new approaches in achieving national security objectives. In addition to a brief history, this environmental scan will also include elements of the current USAF organizational construct, its environment, and strategy.
Historically, the US has relied heavily on the RC, but its role continues to evolve.
Although World War II is largely regarded as a successful, large-scale mobilization of both AC and RC forces, it initially struggled for two reasons. First, civil and military leaders had planned for "…a war effort [undertaken] primarily in defense of the United 3
States" and not an expeditionary fight in foreign lands. 5 Leadership had not aligned the capabilities with the future fight. Second, civil and military leaders falsely expected to have months to train and equip the reserve forces, which were ultimately not prepared for the modern warfare of the day. 6 Readiness was insufficient. These two lessons are well worth revisiting when deciding the best force mix for the 21st Century. In a process known as "Total Force Initiative" (TFI), 121 associations are currently complete or being developed through Business Case Analysis. 26 There are three types of associations, categorized as "Classic," "Active," and "Reserve." The categories signify a "host/tenant" relationship, whereby the host is assigned the physical resources that are shared with the associate: "Classic" is a RegAF host/ARC tenant;
"Active" is an ARC host/RegAF tenant; and "Reserve" is an ARC host/ARC tenant.
27
The USAF has found that this cooperative relationship can "improve operational synergies" and "add capacity during surge operations at reduced cost. 28 Despite a new era of commercial trade spawned by technology and globalization, however, the world economy continues to struggle to gain momentum. The current USAF strategy seeks to align with the greater objectives of the U.S.
defense strategy: prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the AVF. 33 To achieve those objectives, the USAF prescribes a force that is adaptable 8 and capable of deterring concurrent aggression globally, ready to rapidly deploy as an expeditionary power, capable of conducting homeland defense, able to provide support to civil authorities when needed, and able to reconstitute quickly or grow capabilities as needed. 34 These priorities were laid out with the USAF Budget Proposal for FY13, yet sought to meet cuts required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 -recommending a decrease of 3,900 RegAF, 900 AFR, and 5,100 ANG Airmen. 35 Congressional response, terse and immediate, was that such cuts to the ARC were unacceptable. The capstone National Security Strategy (NSS), released in May 2010, outlines President Obama's approach to "…the world as it is, a strategy for the world we seek." 41 To be relevant and to ensure unity of effort throughout the full spectrum of national power, the ARC must ensure that all force shaping options match the approaches identified in the NSS. Particularly germane to the Three Component Air Force, the U.S.
security interests in the NSS are to strengthen security and resiliency at home, disrupt terrorism and violent extremism around the world, reverse the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), invest in the capacity of strong and capable partners, and secure cyberspace. 42 Ensuring strong alliances, building cooperation on key global challenges, and strengthening institutions are also in the best interest of the nation. Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. The document lays out ten primary missions for the U.S. Armed Forces, all of which serve to safeguard national interests and achieve the objectives in the NSS. As the nation moves toward the Joint Force 2020, success relies primarily on three principles. First, an unpredictable strategic environment will "…require a broad portfolio of military capabilities…" 44 Second, the DoD must distinguish scalable mission areas and "…will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force." 45 Third, and complementary to the second principle, is the concept of "reversibility," or the ability to make a course change in an uncertain world. RegAF/ARC balance "…is a key part of the decision calculus" on tough choices of where to invest scarce resources to enhance reversibility.
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Even as the U.S. downsizes the overall force and reduces military expenditures, the DoD strategy cites the necessity to maintain a ready and capable force. Failure to do so undermines the health and quality of the AVF. 47 To avoid the risks of a hollow force, the DoD strategic guidance specifically states:
The Department will need to examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements best suited to the strategy. Over the past decade, the National Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make sustained contributions to national security. The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require that we continue to employ National Guard and Reserve forces. The expected pace of operations over the next decade will be a significant driver in determining an appropriate AC/RC mix and level of RC readiness. Effective use of the Reserve Component also helps preserve and enhance the AVF by increasing its capacity and expanding the range of capabilities it provides. Using the National Guard and Reserve in this way will lower overall personnel and operating costs, better ensure the right mix and availability of equipment, provide more efficient and effective use of defense assets, and contribute to the sustainability of both the Active and Reserve Components. Special Operation Forces (SOF). 56 The study finds the ARC should be the "force of first choice" for those tasks to which it is particularly well suited, due to the cost effective nature and the skill sets the ARC possesses. 57 This provides RegAF manpower trade space to relieve over-tasked units or discover personnel efficiencies where applicable.
Advantageous Mission Capabilities
The ARC is deeply invested in daily USAF core missions. It has a proven track record of sustained full-time support, and both the Chief of the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard Director invite a greater role in the rebalance. Table 1 ). 59 Cyber, Intelligence, Personnel Recovery, Remotely Piloted Aircraft, and Space missions, however, represent only 10 percent or less of the Total Force. Many of these missions are designated low density/high demand, and Reserve growth in these areas is promising.
Conversely, some divestiture of missions solely conducted by ARC, possibly through Active Associations, may be a more consistent rebalance and workload distribution. Table 2 ). 62 Many of these skills sets have become increasingly more important within U.S. borders, and security provided in both the federal and state roles is enhanced with redistribution of these missions to the ARC. To avoid larger expenditures in the future, the DoD must take action to preserve capacity by protecting its investment in training and retaining the operational experience of the last decade. The review directed by the QDR identified the RC as an "…irreplaceable and cost-effective element of overall DoD capacity." 72 In the USAF, the ratio of capacity residing in the RegAF or ARC is unlikely to be a fixed proportion, and will depend on multiple factors stemming from strategy, mission, and budget. Current environmental conditions of drastic cost cutting and low intensity threat profiles, however, suggest trading capacity balance to the ARC where possible. When conditions once again shift to a larger standing force, there will be less buildup required. General Schwartz, former Air Force Chief of Staff, believes "…our associations provide us with the ability to utilize highly experienced Reserve component Airmen in helping to accelerate the maturity of the active component counterparts quicker." 73 This facilitates a reversible force structure, both agile and adaptable, with a greater capacity to surge.
The Combatant Commander's desire for surge capacity will always exist, and that capability is a necessary element of deterrence and operational planning. A Total
Force structure that favors a prominent RegAF conceivably mitigates concerns of access and, to some degree, readiness of forces. However, the mix that forgoes reserve force structure may detrimentally decrease USAF capability to surge for operational and institutional support. In this case, the potential exists to structure a force that is smaller, yet ultimately much more costly. If parochialism is put aside and political leaders focus on national strategic guidance, the USAF may avoid a "0 for 5" on Secretary Lynn's scorecard.
To preserve the continued viability of ARC capacity, the USAF must implement utilization rules established to govern frequency and duration of activations. Such rules "…enhance predictability and judicious use of the RCs." 74 Sustainable requirements must be reasonably matched to target utilization rates. Today, all services use some form of a rotational model to provide support to the Combatant Commander, targeting the SECDEF goal of mobility-to-dwell periods of 1:2 for active and deploy-to-dwell of 1:5 for reserve forces. If deploy-to-dwell is held to these ratios, and does not cross "red lines," the Reserve Component forecasts it can maintain an operational force indefinitely with the AVF. 75 The rotational Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct was developed and implemented shortly after Desert Storm in the early 1990s, which plans to abide by dwell ratios and provides much improved predictability for ARC members. USAF planners are finalizing details on "AEF Next," which returns to a more unit-based deployment plan that will add additional stability and cohesion. 
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PACOM considers this activity critical to shaping the region in an approach aligned with the new military strategic guidance. However, demand will likely exceed available Special Operations Command assets. 78 The ARC Battlefield Air Operations, including combat control, pararescue, combat weather, and tactical air control for manned and unmanned platforms could support a greater RC role in PATs. It is important to point out that the ARC may not always be the least expensive alternative. Deployment rates and a sustained high operational tempo increase costs for pay and benefits. 89 When established as part of the Operational Reserve, the relative cost of a reserve unit can increase from 28 to 40 percent. 90 Cost can continue to rise with the additional use of ARC personnel until they are essentially equivalent to AC costs. Mismanagement scenarios can climb as high as 120 percent in the short term. 91 However, at intermediate levels of employment, savings begin to increase. This is the range where a reversible force structure will systematically compound cost savings during periods of moderate demand. To facilitate timely, flexible management actions, SECAF has directed design and implementation of "Integration of AF Component Personnel Management Systems," commonly referred to as the "3-to-1" personnel system, "…to more efficiently integrate personnel policies, organizations, systems, and processes across the Total Force." 92 The bottom line is that a well-managed ARC is a cost-effective force in its newest evolutionary role in providing national security.
Recommendations
The Three Component Air Force requires more fluid administrative processes for transitioning within the organization. Continuum of Service is a personnel management approach that attempts to provide seamless transitions between full and part-time service, and between the RegAF and the multiple ARC duty statuses. Reversibility will be greatly enhanced when fluid transitions can be made during manning adjustments.
The Integration of Air Force Component Personnel Management Systems, or the "3-to-1" personnel project, needs to be reinvigorated. This improvement of existing systems not only facilitates reversibility, but will address issues and inequitable policies across components, save money and time on processes, and support personnel service delivery efforts. 93 Part of this must include better accounting of the PIRR database.
Overall, this will improve access and agility, and if properly administered, will encourage a lifetime of service to the nation. Applying systems thinking, the USAF should make incremental changes in its complex force structure. Inputs into complex systems do not always produce the intended result. Abrupt adjustments in RegAF/ARC mix could create unforeseen issues or seemingly unassociated problems. The ARC is a cost-efficient, multi-talented force multiplier that will likely be required to step up to an even greater role in some mission sets. Phased implementation of Total Force mix changes allow for progressive evaluation of the effects on costs, readiness, and effectiveness in a dynamic environment. In an uncertain future, frequent assessment of adjustable force management options by Total Force teams will either validate moving forward or suggest capitalizing on the reversibility feature of the Three Component Air Force.
Conclusion
The nation faces a great dilemma. It must determine how to structure and resource the future force against new, adaptive threats during an era of great financial stress. History shows that the U.S. has relied on the RC to augment the AC, although the relationship has evolved to a progressively more integral organization since WWII.
With interoperability at an all time high, the RegAF and ARC now function as a Three
Component Air Force, providing mutual support and forming a cohesive team -capable of more as a well-integrated force than just by the sum of its individual parts. The ARC, once the force multiplier that increased the USAF margin of advantage, now appears to be the complementing mechanism by which scarce resources can be optimized to ensure a smaller, agile, and ready Total Force.
To establish the right mix, USAF planners and programmers should continually reference the tenets of national strategic guidance and doctrine. Total Force readiness and capability are valid concerns, and must be considered in risk calculations. However, the engaged Operational Reserve and the expanding Reserve Associate construct provide the apparatus to mitigate these issues. Operational duty in rotational AEFs builds experience and proficiency while validating currency. Classic, Active, and
Reserve Associations integrate RegAF and ARC training through a cost-efficient use of resources and facilities, as well as providing daily cultural exchange.
The ARC has always been known for providing capacity through strategic depth.
For Joint Force 2020 and beyond, the ARC adds dimensional capacity by absorbing high-demand mission growth, creating a repository for experience and training, and offering agile reversibility features to more quickly rebuild the RegAF when necessary.
Holistic revisions of legislation, policy, and processes are necessary to fully realize the potential benefits of personnel mobility within the Three Component Air Force.
Above all, the ARC is a cost-effective method of maintaining viable, dominant airpower. Of course, any cost-effective measure subject to mismanagement will fail to produce savings. Therefore, planning and employment of ARC forces must avoid red lines and incompatible mission selection to the greatest extent possible. Although not everyone concurs on how to rebalance the USAF during the current drawdown, most will agree some adjustment is necessary to address the national debt as a major threat to U.S. national security. Tough force management decisions lie ahead for the Three Component Air Force-but its problems will be even more difficult in the future if it fails to strategically adapt to the issues of the present.
